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HELENA ROSENBLATI 
Two Liberals on Religion : 
Tocqueville and Constant Compared1
As founding fathers of modem liberalism, Benjamin Constant and 
Alexis de Tocqueville shared a common sensibility as weil as a number 
of key concems. Of central importance to both men was the need to 
protect individual rights and freedoms against what they saw as an 
enéroaching social power. Having leamed the lessons of the French 
Revolution, they knew that power, whether concentrated in the hands of 
one man, or executed in the name of the «people», was a dangerous 
thing. Thus they worked throughout their lives to establish and defend 
a representative system with constitutional guarantees that would protect 
fundamental rights such as freedom of the press, the safety of private 
property, and religious toleration. Both men felt that such guarantees 
were essential to shield individuals from despotic government. 
But both Constant and Tocqueville also agreed that, in the end, laws 
and constitutions were not enough. Indeed, this was another important 
lesson they drew from the Revolution. After ail, a succession of constitu­
tions had corne and gone without ever successfully bringing the 
Revolution to a close. On the contrary, France had experienced successi­
vely more violent upheavals and excesses. Evidently, liberal political 
structures needed something more than laws and constitutions to survive. 
The success of liberal regimes depended on the social, intellectual and 
moral capital of the society that they govemed. 
However, to many people in the nineteenth century, things seemed to 
be getting worse, not better. Judging by the egoism, materialism and 
social fragmentation that they observed ail around them, society was 
heading in the wrong direction. Frenchmen on the left as well as the right 
worried that their country was in the midst of a spiritual and moral crisis. 
In intellectual elites and governing circles, the moral education of France 
became a high priority. Sorne argued for a retum to the Catholic Church; 
1 This paper was delivered at the Society for French Historical Studies conference in 
Paris, 17-20 June, 2004. 
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others placed their hopes in a « new Christianity »2 that might save 
France ; still others attempted to find a secular or nondenominational 
morality that would serve the stabilizing and moralizing function of 
religion. But everyone agreed that successful political systems needed to 
be undergirded by the appropriate moral values. On all sides there were 
calls for a « unifying doctrine » that would put an end to the spiritual 
and intellectual « anarchy » that was thought to be corrosive to social 
order3. 
That Tocqueville was deeply interested in such questions is of course 
well known4• « Je suis bien convaincu », he wrote in 1853, « que les 
societes politiques sont, non ce que les font leurs lois, mais ce que les 
preparent d' avance a etre les sentiments, les croyances, les idees, les 
habitudes de cceur et d'esprit des hommes qui les composent [ ... ] »5. In 
his masterpiece, De la democratie en Amerique, Tocqueville wrote at length 
about the religious and moral values he thought were needed to educate, 
moderate and ultimately sustain democracy. 
That Benjamin Constant was also interested in such questions is less 
well known. Indeed, as Biancamaria Fontana notes in her introduction to 
Constant's Political Writings, Constant's thought« is currently associated 
with the very opposite of the promotion of moral values »6• He is most 
famous for his often-cited defense of modem liberty, in which he stressed 
man's right to the unobstructed enjoyment of « private pleasures » and 
« private independence >>7. Again and again in his writings, Constant 
condemned any interference by political or ecclesiastical authorities in the 
private feelings, tastes and beliefs of citizens. Indeed, his stem denuncia-
2 Edward Berenson, « A New Religion of the Left : Christianity and Social Radicalism 
in France, 1815-1848 », in The French Revolution and the Transformation of Modern 
Political Culture, vol m, Fran~ois and Mona Ozouf (eds), New York, Pergamon Press, 
1989. 
3 I explore this question further in my « Re-evaluating Benjamin Constant's 
liberalism: industrialism, Saint-Simonianism and the Restoration years», History of 
European Ideas, 30, l, 2004, p. 23-37. 
• For Tocqueville's views on religion, see in particular Doris Goldstein, Trial of Faith. 
Religion and Politics in Tocqueville' s Thought, New York, Elsevier, 1975 ; Joshua Mitchell, 
The Fragility of Freedom. Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy and the American Future, 
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995; Agnes Antoine, L'impense de la 
democratie. Tocqueville, la citoyennete et la religion, Fayard, 2003. 
5 Tocqueville to Corcelle, 17 September 1853, in Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville 
et de Francisque de Corcelle, auvres completes, vol. XV, Paris, Gallimard, 1983, p. 80. 
6 « Introduction », ii;i Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, Biancamaria Fontana 
(transl. and ed.), New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 26. 
7 The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, ibid., p. 316-317. 
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ti.on of the Jacobin regime focused precisely upon the violence it had 
exercised on individual rights in the name of allegedly desirable moral 
and social goals. Moreover, in the scholarship on Constant, we are 
frequently reminded of his incurable gambling problems, his womani-
zing, his supposed flip-flopping on important issues ; he was not a man, 
it would seem, very concerned about moral values. 
Recently, however, a small but growing number of scholars have been 
focusing attention on a much-neglected, but important, aspect of 
Constant' s liberalism : precisely the part of his thinking that concerns 
morals and values. Like Tocqueville, Constant was in fact a keen social 
observer, and very interested in the psychological and moral mechanisms 
underpinning society. Also like Tocqueville, Constant was convinced that 
a liberal polity needed moral citizens to survive. It is an aspect of 
Constant's thought that comes to light very quickly if one pays attention 
to his writings on religion. He wrote essays, chapters and books on 
religion, most notably a five-volume scholarly treatise entitled De la 
religion consideree dans sa source, ses formes et ses developpements (1824-1831), 
upon which he worked his entire adult life. It is worth noting that 
Constant himself regarded this book as his most important undertaking 
and achievement. 
This essay will briefly compare and contrast the views of Tocqueville 
and Constant on the right role of religion in modern society. I have two 
main reasons for doing this. One is to generate interest in this still 
neglected side of Constant's thinking. The other is to contribute in a small 
way to a more nuanced and historically sensitive appreciation of 
Tocqueville. In America, Tocqueville is very popular. At present, he is 
especially admired by those (and they are many) who see a crisis in 
American democracy and attribute it to a decline in religion and moral 
values. To them Tocqueville offers profound reflections on « the excesses 
of the democratic soul »8. It is my opinion that despite the valiant efforts 
of a handful of scholars much of this scholarship is lacking in historical 
perspective. For example, it often treats Tocqueville as if he alone among 
liberals understood and appreciated the importance of 'religion, and the 
significance of values. Moreover, it seems to forget that Tocqueville wrote 
with a mainly French audience in mind - and this perspective necessarily 
colored his observations and judgments in ways we should not ignore. 
This paper is a modest attempt to help resituate Tocqueville's ideas on 
religion in their proper nineteenth century French context by contrasting 
them to those of Benjamin Constant. Comparing the views of Constant 
8 Joshua Mitchell, op. cit., p. x. 
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and Tocqueville allows us to see more clearly their distinctiveness. It also 
enables us to appreciate the richness and complexity of early liberalism's 
engagement with the question of religion. Even just a quick glance at the 
ideas of these seminal thinkers reminds us that classical liberalism is a far 
richer and complex body of thought than its current critics - and even 
some of its admirers - will allow. 
First, some important similarities. Both Constant and Tocqueville 
approached religion from the social and political point of view - which 
is to say that they were disciples of Montesquieu. They agreed that the 
usefulness of religion had little if anything to do with its truth; their 
primary concern in writing was not salvation, but life right here on earth. 
Moreover, both men wrote about the importance of religion despite the 
fact that their own faith was somewhat problematic and insecure. 
Constant was born into a Swiss Calvinist family, but had an unconventio-
nal upbringing to say the least. He seems to have started his adult life as 
a convinced atheist only gradually to become, partly through his own 
research into religion, a questioning and unsettled agnostic9, who felt a 
growing respect for religion and a need to believe that was, however, 
never entirely satisfied. Tocqueville, on the other hand, grew up in a 
pious Catholic milieu and was educated by a Jansenist-leaning abbe for 
whom he expressed considerable affection and respect. At the age of 16, 
he suffered a painful loss of faith through exposure to irreligious 
literature at the lycee. Apparently, he never quite recovered from this 
crisis, to his own great disappointment. Both Constant and Tocqueville 
thus struggled with their own religiosity, at times seeming to wish that 
they were more religious than they really were. To his friend, Tocqueville 
confessed« Jene suis pas croyant » but he quickly added« ce que je suis 
loin de dire pour me vanter »10• Constant could very well have said the 
same thing. 
Neither man, it should be noted, expressed adherence to any of the 
specifically theological doctrines of Christianity ; they both appreciated 
religion for essentially social, political and moral reasons. Constant, a 
thinker of Protestant descent and culture, examined the politico-religious 
conditions in Catholic France; whereas Tocqueville, a scion of the 
Catholic nobility, meditated on the manners and morals of a Protestant 
country. There was a similar practical edge to both men's work since both 
men were politicians as well as theorists. As such they were keenly 
interested in what was politically necessary to preserve liberty in post-
9 Henri Gouhier, Benjamin Constant devant la religion. Paris, Desclee de Brouwer, 1989, 
coll. « Les ecrivains devant Dieu », p. 41. 
10 Tocqueville to Gobineau, 2 octobre 1843, CEuvres Completes, Paris, Gallimard, vol. 
IX, 1959, p. 57. 
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Revolutionary France. Keeping liberty alive and civilization on the right 
track was a shared '-concern - and for this religion was essential. 
Fundamental to both men was the idea that religion was a force against 
despotism. This may surprise modern readers. Constant and Tocqueville 
agreed that it was a lack of religion that prepared people for servitude. 
Constant expressed himself unambiguously on this question : « L' absence 
du sentiment religieux favorise [ ... ] toutes les pretentions de la tyran-
nie »1\while the presence of religious sentiment favors liberty. « Des 
peuples religieux ont pu @tre esclaves », he wrote, but« aucun peuple 
irreligieux n'est demeure libre »12• Only a few years later, Tocqueville 
expressed himself similarly : « C' est le despotisme qui peut se passer de 
la foi, mais non la liberte. [ ... ] s'il n'a pas de foi, il faut qu'il serve, et, s'il 
est libre, qu'il croie. »13 
Religion was needed in liberal and democratic polities because it 
combated egoism and destructive individualism. The two men agreed on 
this as well. Regretfully, Constant noted that modern men tended to be 
« dominated by egoism and softened by luxury >>1''. Religion countered 
this egoism ; it pulled self-interested and often apathetic men out of 
themselves, teaching them« la puissance du sacrifice »15• Religion, along 
with all the other noble passions « font sortir l'homme du cercle etroit de 
ses interets »16• « Laliberte », Constant insisted,« se nourrit de sacrifices 
[ ... ] [elle] ne peut s'etablir, ne peut se conserver, que par le desinteresse-
ment. »17 
Likewise, Tocqueville wrote that, through the injunction of brotherly 
love, Christianity drew men out of themselves, thus counteracting the 
isolating effects of individualism. But he believed that this was in fact an 
effect of all religions : 
11 n'y a point de religion qui ne place I' objet des desirs de l'homme au-dela 
et au-dessus des biens de la terre, et qui n'eleve naturellement son fune vers 
des regions fort superieurs a celles des sens18• 
11 Benjamin Constant, De la religion consideree dans sa source, ses ftmnes et ses developpe-
ments, Etienne Hofmann and Tzvetan Todorov (eds.), Aries, Actes Sud, 1999, p. 62. 
l2 Ibid. 
13 A. de Tocqueville, De la democratie en Amerique, Eduardo Nolla (ed.}, Paris, Vrin, 
1990, vol. I, p. 229 ; vol. II, p. 34. 
14 De la religion, op. cit., p. 245. 
15 Principes de politique, in B. Constant Ecrits politiques, Marcel Gauchet (ed.), Paris, 
Gallimard, 1997, p. 466. 
16 Ibid., p. 465. 
17 B. Constant, De la religion, qp. cit., p. 34, 62. 
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Very much like Constant, Tocqueville worried that without religion, 
people would succumb to « le gout du bien--etre »19, an exaggerated 
« amour des jouissances materielles »20 and an « indifference complete 
et brutale de l'avenir »21 • To Tocqueville, religion encouraged the 
longterm thinking essential to making moral decisions. All this is why 
Tocqueville believed religion to be« beaucoup plus necessaire clans [ ... ] 
les republiques democratiques que dans toutes les autres »22• 
Both men also shared the belief that religion was « natural » to man. To 
Constant, religion was an indestructible «emotion», « un sentiment 
inherent a l'homme »23• Similarly, Tocqueville called religion a natural 
human « instinct. » To him it was the lack of religion that was unnatural : 
« L'incredulite », he wrote, « est un accident; la foi seule est l'etat 
permanent de l'hwnanite. »24 
Why, then, had religious belief visibly declined over the course of the 
eighteenth century ? Both men responded similarly. According to 
Constant, it had to do with the illiberal and intolerant policies of both 
ecclesiastical and political authorities : · 
{O]n a denature la religion. L'on a poursuivil'homme dans ce dernier asyle, 
dans ce sanctuaire intime de son existence. La persecution provoque la 
revolte25• 
According to Tocqueville as well, church and state attempts to enforce 
religious compliance were counterproductive. Such policies drove people 
away from religion. But religion would naturally reassert itself once such 
ill-conceived policies were rescinded. 
This brings us to another important point on which Constant and 
Tocqueville agreed. Both men were strong advocates of church/state 
separation - and this in the interest of both religion and the state. In their 
minds, a fruitful collaboration between politics and religion was only 
possible under the conditions of legal disestablishment and religious 
toleration such as was found in America. Indeed, both referred to 
America as a place where the separation of church and state was having 
favorable effects. 
19 Ibid., p. 36. 
20 Ibid., p. 34. 
21 Ibid., p. 134. 
22 De la dbnocratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. I, p. 229. 
23 Du developpement progressif des idees religieuses, in Ecrits politiques, op. cit., p. 639. 
24 De la democratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. I, p. 231. 
25 Principes de politique, in B. Constant, op. cit., p. 468. 
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Having considered some of their main areas of agreement, we can now 
turn to their differences. Let us begin by considering the definition of 
religion. To Constant, the essence of religion is religious sentiment, which, 
as we have seen, he describes as an intuitive and indestructible « emo­
tion » inherent in all human beings. In the course of history, this inner 
sentiment has taken on outward «forms», that is, the dogmas and 
ceremonies of established religions. These forms are necessarily tran­
sient - good for only a time. In his scholarly treatise De la religion, 
Constant describes the dynamic between form and sentiment in some 
detail, arguing that it causes the gradual improvement of religion by a 
natural process motored by the liberating force of sentiment. The point 
is that for Constant, it is religious sentiment - something that inheres in 
all varieties of religion - that does the good work of moralizing indivi­
duals. It is religious sentiment that pulls individuals out of themselves, 
causing them to give of themselves and improve themselves26• 
Tocqueville, on the other hand, occasionally speaks of religious 
« sentiments » or « instincts » - normally using the plural - but he differs 
dramatically from Constant when he asserts that it is dogma that is « la 
substance des religions »27• Indeed, for Tocqueville, not only is it dogma 
that does the beneficial work of religion for society, but it is the fact that 
dogma is fixed that appeals to him. He believes that« [d]es idees arretees 
sur Dieu et la nature humaine sont indispensables a la pratique journa­
liere de [la] vie »28• This is true for individuals as well as societies. 
Unsettled ideas prepare men for servitude and lead only to « [le]
desordre et l'impuissance »29• 
For Tocqueville, doubts and questions about religion are profoundly 
disturbing to people : « Cette perpetuelle agitation de toutes choses les 
inquiete et les fatigue. »30 Such intellectual restlessness is dangerous 
because it leads to a type of despair that is conducive to political apathy 
and thus to despotism. Men are simply not strong enough to cope with 
religious and political freedom simultaneously. « Pour moi », Tocqueville 
wrote, « je doute que l'homme puisse jamais supporter a la fois une 
complete independance religieuse et une entiere liberte politique. »31 In 
order for citizens to remain politically alert and engaged, their imagina-
26 I explain this further in my « Commerce et religion dans le liberalisme de Benjamin 
Constant», Commentaire, vol. 102 (ete 2003), p. 415-426. 
v De la democratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. II, p. 36. 
28 Ibid., p. 33.
29 
Ibid., p. 33.
30 Ibid., p. 34.
31 Ibid., p. 34. 
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tions in matters of religion must be quelled. They need settled answers 
to unsettling questions. What is good in America is that you have a 
religion« qu'on croit sans la discuter [ ... ], les Americains, ayant admis sans
examen les principaux dogmes de la religion chretienne [ ... J »32• Joshua 
Mitchell has recently called this « the cornerstone » of Tocqueville's
liberalism. The« paradox of freedom[ ... ] is that it requires an obedience,
a passivity before God »33• Indeed, it is with considerable admiration
that Tocqueville describes the subduing action of religion on the human
mind:
L'esprit humain [ ... ] s'arrete de lui-meme; il depose en tremblant l'usage 
de ses plus redoutables facultes [ ... ]; il s'abstient meme de soulever le voile 
du sanctuaire ; il s'incline avec respect devant des verites qu'il admet sans les 
discutei34. 
Elsewhere, Tocqueville refers to this voluntary submission to religious 
dogma as« un joug salutaire » 35• 
This is about as far from Constant's point of view as you can get. 
According to Constant, no social good can come from inflicting an 
intellectual or spiritual straight-jacket on human beings. Taking what 
seems to be the opposite stance to Tocqueville' s, Constant argued not 
only that spiritual submission would be counter-productive, leading to 
« apathy » and « numbness »36 in the citizenry, but that it would be 
profoundly immoral as well. Religious questioning and striving is always 
a good thing for Constant, who speaks with evident pride and awe of 
« cette noble inquietude qui nous poursuit et qui nous tourmente, 
cette ardeur d'etendre nos lumieres et de developper nos facultes »37• 
« L'homme a ete cree pour s'instruire, pour s'eclairer, et par la m�me, 
pour s'adoucir et s'ameliorer. »38 It is for this reason that God endowed 
man with« un penchant invincible a !'investigation et a l'examen »39.To 
obstruct this penchant would be to go against God ; it would be to favor 
both superstition in religion and despotism in politics. In fact, an 
32 Ibid., p. 17, emphasis added. 
33 J. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 206.
34 De la democratie en Amerique, up. cit., vol. I, p. 35. A. Antoine (up. cit., p. 148-154) is 
insightful on this. 
35 De la democratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. II, p. 33. 
36 De M. Dunoyer et de quelques-uns de ses ouvrages, in B. Constant, Ecrits politiques, 
op. cit., p. 676. 
37 De la liberte des anciens comparee a celle des modernes, in Ecrits politiques, up. cit., p. 617. 
38 De M. Dunoyer [ ... ], up. cit., p. 662. 
39 Du developpement progressif des idees religieuses, ibid., p. 635. 
I 
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individual's use of private judgment is not just recommended; it is 
required - and it is this which will save civilization from its own 
materialistic, depoliticizing and de-spiritualizing tendencies. 
To try to foster and/ or defend a unity of doctrine is equally unnatural 
and harmful. To Constant, the proliferation of sects is a good thing. 
Repeatedly, Constant insists that societies have nothing to fear from 
intellectual and spiritual pluralism. « Cette multitude des sectes dont on 
s'epouvante », he wrote, « est ce qu'il y a pour la religion de plus 
salutaire »40• If authorities would just let religion be, « les sectes se 
multiplieraient a l'infini », causing a healthy competition between them 
which would have both favorable intellectual and moral repercussions41. 
Freedom of conscience is the motor of human progress ; it is what allows 
Christianity to be « perfectible » and to stay forever relevant in other 
words to improve over time. Constant added that this was a process that 
one could see at work in the United States. George Armstrong Kelly was 
right, I think, when he several years ago called Constant's point of view 
broadly« Protestant» - for such was its tendencies and sources42• 
Tocqueville, on the other hand, adopts a point of view that is quite 
critical of Protestantism. Indeed, in the second volume of Democracy in 
America, he suggests that it is Catholicism and not Protestantism that 
would be most effective in democratic regimes. Modern men have a 
profound need for the certainty that only Catholicism provides. When it 
comes to religion, Tocqueville insists that « l' esprit d'independance 
individuelle [ ... ] est le plus dangereux de tous »43• Not surprisingly, then, 
he shows considerable contempt for the revival movement that he had 
the opportunity to observe in America. He refers to the new sects as 
« fanatical spiritualism » and « religious insanity» - « folies religieu-
ses » 44 - and laments « !'horrible portrait » of men « se livrant a des 
transports qui les font descendre au-dessous des brutes »45• Luckily, 
Tocqueville adds, this bizarre phenomenon is just a momentary aberra-
40 Principes de politique, ibid., p. 476. 
41 Ibid., p. 477. 
42 George Armstrong Kelly, The Humane Comedy: Constant, Tocqueville and French 
Liberalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 76. Kurt Kloocke is the 
expert on Constant's connections with German Protestant thought. Start with 
« Benjamin Constant et I' Allemagne : Individualite - Religion - Politique », Anna/es 
Benjamin Constant, vol. 27, 2003 ; on this, see also James Lee, « Benjamin Constant : 
The Moralization of Modem Liberty», Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2003 
43 De la democratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. II, p. 38. 
44 Ibid., p. 122. 
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tion, which assuredly will not last. As the American example proves, 
modern men are endowed with « un instinct cache qui les pousse a leur 
insu vers le catholicisme »46• It is this that accounts for the fact that 
« [l]'Amerique est[ ... ] le pays ou [ ... J la religion catholique fait le plus de 
progres »47• 
Agnes Antoine has recently argued that, in its main lines, Tocqueville's 
point of view echoed that of the French Catholic Church, while Joshua 
Mitchell has made a strong case for its Augustinian and Pascalian 
sources. It is quite surprising to observe this seminal liberal thinker 
consistently associating religion with the salutary submission to authority. 
Manifestly, religion serves for Tocqueville as a kind of mind-police48• 
While Constant believed that religion supported free govermnents 
because the Protestant spirit of examination contributed directly to 
democratic culture, for Tocqueville, religion played the role of a 
«palliative», a «remedy» and an «antidote» to what he held to be 
democracy's harmful tendencies49• One could say that both men in fact 
adopted older arguments already current during the Enlightemnent ; 
however, Tocqueville viewed religion mainly as a bridle, while Constant 
saw it more as a spur'm. 
I could end the story here, but I think it would be misleading, with 
regard to Tocqueville. It would be to neglect what appears to have been 
a significant shift in his thinking several years after he wrote De la 
democratie en Amerique. There is indeed evidence that Tocqueville 
underwent a change in outlook about religion. It is something briefly 
noted by Doris Goldstein some years ago, but curiously neglected by 
scholarship since51• 
Tocqueville's deep frustration with, and contempt for, the oppressive 
imperial regime installed by Louis Napoleon after his coup d'Etat in 1851 
is well known. Others before me have argued that witnessing the political 
46 Ibid., p. 38. 
47 Ibid. 
48A. Antoine, op. cit., p. 152. Stephen Holmes has gone further, claiming that 
Tocqueville in fact viewed religion « more or less in the counter-Enlightenment 
tradition, as a salutary opium of the people. » S. Holmes, « Constant and Tocqueville : 
An Unexplored Relationship», Annales Benjamin Constant, vol. 12, 1991, p. 40. 
49 Words repeatedly used (rightly, I think) by Joshua Mitchell to describe Tocqueville's 
view of religion. 
50 On religion as a« bridle» and/or« spur», see Helena Rosenblatt,« The Christian 
Enlightenment », The Cambridge History of Christianity, vol VIl : Enlightenment, 
Revolution and Reawakening (1660-1815), Timothy Tackett and Stewart Brown (eds), 
forthcoming 2005. 
51 D. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 90-97. 
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deterioration of France led Tocqueville to emphasize more than ever the 
importance of political participation in sustaining liberal and democratic 
regimes52• But what is generally overlooked is that he seems not only to 
have begun to reconceptualize his notion of democracy, but that he also 
seems to have reconsidered the relationship between Christianity and 
citizenship. 
By the 1850s, and along with other liberal Catholics, Tocqueville became 
increasingly frustrated by the transformation of Catholicism into what 
Montalembert referred to as a « school of servitude». The ease with 
which French Catholics accepted Napoleon's imperial rule was distressing 
proof of Christianity's basic failure to encourage citizenship. According 
to Tocqueville, this had to change. Evidence of his new perspective 
appears in the Ancien Regime et Ia Revolution. Moreover, in a series of 
letters to his friend, Sophie Swetchine, Tocqueville clarified his altered 
view of the role of the Church. He now argued that the Catholic clergy 
should assume responsibility for reanimating public spirit in France. Since 
1789, he explained, French priests had been shirking their duty. Their 
role, Tocqueville argued, was not just to teach<< private » virtues, but also 
« public » ones ; thus would they help restore a desperately needed sense 
of citizenship in an apathetic population. Priests should teach their 
parishioners that they belong not only to a heavenly community, but to 
a « patrie » as well : 
Je desirerais qu'ils fissent penetrer plus avant clans les fun.es que chacun se 
doit a cet etre collectif [la patrie] avant de s'appartenir a soi-meme; qu'a 
l'egard de cet etre-la, il n'est pas permis de tomber dans !'indifference, bien 
moins encore de faire de cette indifference une sorte de molle vertu [ ... ] tous 
sont responsables [ ... ] de veiller ace qu'il ne soit soumis qu'a des autorites 
bienfaisantes, respectables et legitime [ ... ] Voila ce que je voudrais qu'on 
inculqutl.t aux homrnes [ ... }53 
In conclusion I would say that Constant's and Tocqueville's perspec-
tives - though both liberal - were, quite different1 reflecting their different 
temperaments, backgrounds and immediate historical contexts. According 
52 Fran<;0is Furet and Fran~oise Melonio were the first to argue for a late change in 
T ocqueville's thought by which he reversed his concept of democracy. I have learned 
much about this from the work of Mel Richter. See in particular his « Tocqueville and 
Guizot on democracy: from a type of society to a political regime», in History of 
European Ideas, 30, 1, 2004, p. 61-82. But see also Cheryl Welch's piece in the same 
journal. 
53 Tocqueville to M""' Swetchine, 20 October 1856, in Lettres inedites de Madame 
Swetchine publiees par le comte de Falloux, Paris, Didier & Cie, 1866, p. 467. 
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to Tocqueville - and although his position evolved over time - religion's 
express role was to enable political liberty, and hence to prevent the 
degeneration of democracy into despotism. In Democracy in America, 
where he viewed democracy mainly as a « social condition » and not as 
a political form, he saw religion as an antidote to democracy's dangerous 
social side-effects. Later in life, when he viewed democracy more 
politically, he hoped that religion would directly encourage political life. 
In contrast, I think that Constant focused more on the individual and 
his intellectual and moral progress. He saw religious and political liberty 
as together contributing to the improvement of man - « le triomphe de 
l'individualite », as he called it:54. Indeed, there is a sense that for 
Constant this is what both liberal political regimes and religion are for 
they are there to enable human beings to develop their moral and 
intellectual faculties. I believe it is this that Constant was referring to 
when he wrote that « ce n' est pas au bonheur seul, c' est au perfectionne­
ment que notre destin nous appelle » ; 
ce n' est point I' absence de la religion, mais sa presence avec la liberte 
politique et religieuse qu'il faut invoquer comme la source unique de tous Jes 
progres intellectuels, aussi bien que de toutes les vertus55• 
54 
Preface to Melanges de litterature et de politique, in B. Constant, Ecrits politiques, op. cit., 
p. 623.
55 De la liberM des anciens comparee a celle des modernes, op. cit., p. 617.
